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COMMANDEERING, THE TENTH 
AMENDMENT, AND THE FEDERAL 
REQUISITION POWER: NEW YORK v. 
UNITED STATES REVISITED 
Erik M. Jensen* and Jonathan L. Entin** 
In New York v. United States,1 which articulated the Su-
preme Court’s current approach to the Tenth Amendment,2 Jus-
tice O’Connor’s majority opinion relied heavily on original un-
derstanding. “[T]he question whether the Constitution should 
permit Congress to employ state governments as regulatory 
agencies was a topic of lively debate among the Framers,”3 wrote 
O’Connor, and all the justices seemed to agree on the most sig-
nificant historical point: the founders generally thought that the 
national government should not be issuing orders to the states. 
That understanding led to the conclusion, accepted by six mem-
bers of the Court, that “[t]he Federal Government may not 
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory 
program.”4 
On the last day of the 1996-97 term, the Court announced 
its decision in yet another Tenth Amendment case, Printz v. 
United States.5 The Court once again immersed itself in history, 
this time analyzing several numbers of The Federalist6 on the 
 *  Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
 **  Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. We 
appreciate the helpful comments of our colleague Neil Kinkopf, who is not responsible 
for any remaining mistakes. 
 1. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 2. The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const., amend. X. 
 3. New York, 505 U.S. at 163. 
 4. Id. at 188. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and 
Thomas joined the O’Connor opinion in full. Justices Stevens, White, and Blackmun 
concurred in the historical section, but each dissented from the Court’s decision. 
 5. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
 6. Indeed, dissenting Justice Souter wrote that “it is The Federalist that finally de-
termines my position.” Id. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=110996
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way to determining whether the national government could com-
mand state executive officers to participate in a federal regula-
tory scheme. Justice Scalia, for a five-justice majority, character-
ized Printz as a relatively straightforward application of New 
York: 
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States 
to enact or enforce a federal regulatory system. Today we 
hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by 
conscripting the State’s officers directly. The Federal Gov-
ernment may neither issue directives requiring the States to 
address particular problems, nor command the States’ offi-
cers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or 
enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether 
policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the 
burdens or benefits is necessary . . . .7 
Although some of the New York language was quite 
broad—two Printz dissenters characterized it as dictum8—that 
language was elevated to the level of a per se rule.9 
The New York Court was right that the Constitution was in-
tended to dramatically change the role of the states in the na-
tional government; we doubt that anyone would seriously dis-
pute that point. It is also a matter of historical record—Justice 
O’Connor marshalled many pithy quotations to this effect—that 
many founders questioned the propriety and practicality of fed-
eral orders directed to state governments.10 
But the Court may well have gotten the original under-
standing wrong by reading too much into the historical evidence 
presented to it. Questions of propriety are not the same as ques-
tions of constitutionality; as Justice Powell once observed, “Mis-
guided laws may nonetheless be constitutional.”11 When, in 
 7. Id. at 2384. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Thomas joined the Scalia opinion. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dis-
sented. 
 8. See, e.g., id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2404 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 9. Justice Scalia wrote: “We . . . conclude  categorically, as we concluded categori-
cally in New York: ‘The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or ad-
minister a federal regulatory program.’” Id. at 2383 (quoting New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. at 188). 
 10. New York, 505 U.S. at 163-66. 
 11. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972).  See also Jonathan L. Entin, Con-
gress, the President, and the Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Value of Litigation, 43 
Admin. L. Rev. 31, 56-59 (1991); Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political 
Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 175, 224-26 (1990). The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly recognized the distinction between a statute’s wisdom and 
its constitutionality, both in cases where a law has been upheld and in cases where it has 
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Printz, Justice Scalia quoted James Madison to the effect that 
“[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for 
the States as political bodies had been exploded on all hands,”12 
the Justice elevated Madison’s practical point to a principle of 
constitutional law. Perhaps the national government ought to re-
strain itself from compelling states to participate in national 
regulatory schemes, but it is not clear that the Constitution re-
quires that result.13 
We shall present evidence in one substantive area, taxation, 
that we think undercuts the intellectual basis for both New York 
and Printz: many founders (including Alexander Hamilton) be-
lieved that the discredited revenue system of the Articles of 
Confederation, under which funds were requisitioned from the 
states, survived ratification of the Constitution. In theory at 
least, requisitions represented a significant exercise of federal 
power: the national government could order each state to supply 
a predetermined amount of revenue to the national treasury. 
What could be a clearer application of national power than 
mandating that state governments collect and send millions—or, 
if we adjust eighteenth-century figures to reflect modern revenue 
needs, billions—of dollars to the nation’s capital? 
To be sure, the justices in New York and Printz didn’t ig-
nore issues of taxation. One of O’Connor’s pithy quotes dealt 
with the requisitions system,14 although no significance was at-
tached to that fact, and sizeable chunks of several Printz opin-
ions considered whether the national government has the power 
to use state officials to administer federal revenue statutes.15 But 
even the dissenting justices missed the key point that was staring 
them in the face: the historical materials they studied assumed—
and in one case made explicit—that requisitions, however ineffi-
been struck down. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1197 
(1997); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 
590 (1952); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934). 
 12. Max Farrand, ed., 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 9 (July 14, 
1787) (Yale U. Press, 1937) (“Records”). 
 13. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s evaluation 
of the historical evidence . . . fails to acknowledge the important difference between pol-
icy decisions that may have been influenced by respect for state sovereignty concerns, 
and decisions that are compelled by the Constitution.”). 
 14. See text accompanying note 37. 
 15. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372-73 (Scalia, J.); id. at 2389-94 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 2401-04 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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cient and otherwise undesirable they might have been, survived 
as a constitutional matter.16 
Our argument proceeds as follows. After we outline the 
constitutional history set out in New York and Printz, we explain 
why the results in those cases are superficially supported by the 
history of requisitions: the Constitution created a system of indi-
rect and direct taxation to serve as the sources of revenue; it con-
tains no mention of requisitions; and several proposed amend-
ments that would have preserved a specific role for requisitions 
went nowhere. In the last section of the article, however, we pre-
sent the evidence that requisitions did not disappear from na-
tional revenue possibilities—evidence that is perfectly consistent 
with the distaste of many founders for the requisitions process. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY IN NEW YORK AND 
PRINTZ 
For much of the nation’s history, the Tenth Amendment 
was viewed as a substantive limitation on federal power. That 
provision was an important part of the background against which 
the Supreme Court decided such landmark cases as McCulloch 
v. Maryland17 and Gibbons v. Ogden.18 As the results in these 
cases suggest, invocation of the Amendment was no guarantee of 
success for opponents of federal legislation.19 Nevertheless, the 
Tenth Amendment provided part of the Court’s rationale for 
striking down federal laws in such decisions as The Civil Rights 
Cases,20 Hammer v. Dagenhart,21 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States,22 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.23 
The Court’s ultimate acceptance of the New Deal implied a 
very different attitude toward Tenth Amendment claims. For 
 16. See, e.g., Federalist 36 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Pa-
pers 217, 220-21 (Mentor, 1961) (“The Federalist”), quoted and discussed in notes 91-92 
and accompanying text. At least one commentator has made the same error. See Saik-
rishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 1971-88 (1993). 
 17. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819). 
 18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197-98 (1824); see also Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (noting that it was “universally understood” that the Bill of 
Rights was intended to prevent abuses by the federal government only). 
 19. Other examples of cases in which Tenth Amendment arguments were rejected 
include Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 
27, 61 (1904); and Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903). 
 20. 109 U.S. 3, 15 (1883). 
 21. 247 U.S. 251, 274-76 (1918). 
 22. 295 U.S. 495, 528-29 (1935). 
 23. 298 U.S. 238, 293-95 (1936). 
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nearly four decades after 1937, the conventional wisdom re-
flected Justice Stone’s observation in United States v. Darby24 
that “[t]he amendment states but a truism that all is retained 
which has not been surrendered.”25 Although Darby signaled 
that the Court no longer viewed the Tenth Amendment as pro-
viding enforceable limits on the overall scope of federal author-
ity, the 1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery26 sug-
gested that the amendment might shield the states (but not 
private parties) from some regulatory measures emanating from 
Washington. In that case a closely divided Court ruled that the 
Tenth Amendment precluded the federal government from 
regulating the states in ways that interfered with their perform-
ance of traditional governmental functions.27 National League of 
Cities involved the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
to employees of state and local governments. There followed a 
series of decisions in which the Court refined its constitutional 
test but rejected Tenth Amendment challenges to other general 
regulatory measures that incidentally affected the states.28 
After this series of cases, National League of Cities might 
have seemed aberrant, and indeed it was overruled only nine 
years later. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority,29 the Court rejected the traditional-governmental-
functions test as unworkable and declared that federalism con-
cerns were generally better addressed in the political than in the 
judicial arena. But four justices dissented in Garcia; two explic-
itly predicted that the issue would return to the Court and that 
the outcome would eventually be very different.30 The first step 
in that direction came in Gregory v. Ashcroft,31 where the Court 
 24. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 25. Id. at 124. 
 26. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 27. That ruling drew on dicta and separate opinions in several post-New Deal deci-
sions. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (despite Darby, Tenth 
Amendment “is not without significance”); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201-05 
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) (not-
ing the existence of “State activities and State-owned property that partake of unique-
ness from the point of view of intergovernmental relations” that might be immune from 
federal regulation). 
 28. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (Public Utilities Regulatory Policies 
Act); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (Railway 
Labor Act); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act). 
 29. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 30. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 31. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
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noted Tenth Amendment concerns in suggesting that Congress 
must clearly express its intention to apply federal regulatory 
statutes to the states. The next step came the following year in 
New York v. United States,32 where the question was no longer 
whether the federal government could apply otherwise permissi-
ble measures to the states as well as to private actors, but rather 
whether the federal government could regulate the states di-
rectly by passing laws aimed exclusively at state governments. 
A. NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES 
The narrow holding of New York v. United States is that 
Congress may not order states either to take title to radioactive 
waste or to regulate the disposal of such waste. Neither directive 
standing alone would pass constitutional muster, said a majority 
of the Court—coercing the states in such a manner was imper-
missible—and a “choice between two unconstitutionally coercive 
regulatory techniques is no choice at all.”33 
In her opinion for the Court, Justice O’Connor looked to 
the founders’ understanding of the relationship between the na-
tional government and the state governments. O’Connor’s mini-
history described the battle at the Constitutional Convention be-
tween adherents of two very different conceptions of what the 
national government should be. The New Jersey Plan, intro-
duced by William Paterson, saw the national government operat-
ing directly on state governments, as was true under the Articles 
of Confederation. In contrast, the Virginia Plan, introduced by 
Edmund Randolph, rejected the structure of the Articles—had 
the Articles worked, there would have been no need for a consti-
tutional convention—and saw the national government necessar-
ily operating directly on individuals.34 
The Virginia Plan, in modified form, prevailed. Wrote 
O’Connor, “[T]he Convention opted for a Constitution in which 
Congress would exercise its legislative authority directly over in-
dividuals rather than over States.”35 And O’Connor’s lengthy se-
ries of quotations is evidence of many founders’ understanding 
that, in the words of Rufus King, “[l]aws, to be effective . . . must 
not be laid on states, but upon individuals.”36 
 32. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 33. Id. at 176. 
 34. Id. at 163-66. 
 35. Id. at 165. 
 36. Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2 Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 56 
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For present purposes, the most telling quotation comes 
from Alexander Hamilton, who, in urging support for the Con-
stitution at the New York ratifying convention, stressed the futil-
ity of requisitions as the foundation of the national revenue sys-
tem: 
But can we believe that one state will ever suffer itself to be 
used as an instrument of coercion? The thing is a dream; it is 
impossible. Then we are brought to this dilemma—either a 
federal standing army is to enforce the requisitions, or the 
federal treasury is left without supplies, and the government 
without support. What, sir, is the cure for this great evil? 
Nothing, but to enable the national laws to operate on indi-
viduals, in the same manner as those of the states do.37 
To the New York majority, the lesson of history was 
straightforward: the Constitution extended the national power 
over individuals—on that point everyone agreed—and it simul-
taneously contracted the power that existed under the Articles 
to order states to obey national directives. But the idea that an 
extension of power over individuals required a contraction of 
power over the states is hardly obvious. And it is the proposition 
that a nationalist Constitution could have been intended to re-
duce national power in some respects that dissenting justices in 
New York found so counterintuitive.38 
B. PRINTZ V. UNITED STATES 
In Printz, too, founding-era history was controlling. Printz 
considered whether the national government could order chief 
law enforcement officers of local jurisdictions to perform back-
ground checks on would-be purchasers of firearms, an interim 
obligation imposed by the so-called Brady Act until the national 
government could get its own checking system into operation.39 
Although the Brady Act program seems to have been a rela-
(Jonathan Elliot, 1845) (“Debates”) (speaking at Massachusetts ratifying convention), 
quoted in New York, 505 U.S. at 165. 
 37. Id. at 233 (June 20, 1788), quoted in New York, 505 U.S. at 165-66. 
38. [T]he Framers of the Constitution empowered the Federal Government to 
exercise legislative authority directly over individuals within the States, even 
though that direct authority constituted a greater intrusion on State sovereignty. 
Nothing in that history suggests that the Federal Government may not also im-
pose its will upon the several States as it did under the Articles. The Constitu-
tion enhanced, rather than diminished, the power of the Federal Government. 
New York, 505 U.S. at 210 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 39. The full name is the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act; the invalidated 
provision can be found at 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994). 
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tively small, indeed trivial, incursion on state sovereignty, the 
Printz majority thought New York was controlling: Tenth 
Amendment prohibitions could not be avoided by bypassing 
state legislatures and issuing orders directly to state executive of-
ficials.40 
Much of the historical discussion in Printz dealt with what 
dissenting Justice Stevens called the “remarkably similar . . . 
question, heavily debated by the Framers of the Constitution, 
whether the Congress could require state agents to collect fed-
eral taxes.”41 As we discuss in Part II, the new national govern-
ment was going to have its own revenue system that could oper-
ate directly on individuals, and it would need officials to 
administer that system. Would those officials be new federal 
agents or would existing state and local bureaucrats do the 
work? Unlike New York, where there was general agreement 
about the grand patterns of the founding, the justices in Printz 
divided sharply on the original understanding of this narrow is-
sue. 
All justices agreed—they had to—that founding-era evi-
dence suggests that it would often make sense for the national 
government to use the administrative apparatuses of the states 
and localities. For example, when antifederalists expressed con-
cern that the national government might send “a swarm of reve-
nue and excise officers to pray [sic] upon the honest and indus-
trious part of the community,”42 Alexander Hamilton responded, 
in Federalist 36, that at least in some cases Congress would 
probably “make use of the State officers and State regulations 
for collecting” federal taxes.43 And James Madison, in Federalist 
45, agreed: “the eventual collection [of revenue] under the im-
mediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the 
 40. Of the four dissenters, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer (only Stevens had 
been a part of the New York Court) apparently concluded that both New York and 
Printz were wrongly decided. Justice Souter, who had sided with the New York majority, 
thought the two cases could be distinguished, and he adhered to New York’s result, if not 
to all of its language. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2404 (Souter, J., dissenting): 
I continue to agree . . . that Congress may not require a state legislature to enact 
a regulatory scheme and that New York v. United States . . . was rightly decided 
(even though I now believe its dicta went too far toward immunizing state ad-
ministration as well as state enactment of such a scheme from congressional 
mandate). 
 41. Id. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 42. Essays of Brutus, N.Y. J. (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in Herbert J. Storing, 2 The 
Complete Antifederalist 388, 390 (U. of Chicago Press, 1981), quoted in Printz, 117 S. Ct. 
at 2390 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 43. The Federalist No. 36, at 221 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16); see text accompany-
ing note 52 (containing a longer quotation from Federalist 36). 
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officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several 
States.”44 
The Printz majority concluded that those quotations by 
themselves meant very little. Justice Scalia wrote that “none of 
these statements [in The Federalist] necessarily implies . . . that 
Congress could impose these responsibilities without the consent 
of the States.”45 Thus, if national obligations were imposed on 
state executives, these had to be the result of agreements. And if 
state officers were convinced to do federal bidding, it would be 
because they would be paid by the national government, not be-
cause they would be commandeered.46 
Balderdash, responded four dissenters, particularly Justices 
Stevens and Souter,47 and, on the status of revenue collectors, 
the dissenters had the better of it. It is hard to read Federalist 27, 
36, 44, and 45, the four papers focused on by several justices, as 
supporting the idea that a state could simply refuse to have its 
officials carry out any otherwise valid federal dicta
The analytical progression begins with Federalist 27, in 
which Hamilton stated that the constitutional plan, “by extend-
ing the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of 
the several States, will enable the government to employ the or-
dinary magistracy of each in the execution of its laws.”48 Hamil-
ton went on to state that “the legislatures, courts, and magis-
trates, of the respective members will be incorporated into the 
operations of the national government as far as its just and con-
stitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the 
 44. The Federalist No. 45, at 292 (Madison) (cited in note 16). 
 45. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 46. Id. at 2374. 
 47. “Balderdash,” if anything, understates the extent of the heat generated by the 
exchanges in Printz. Justice Stevens, for example, used language such as “[n]o fair read-
ing of [the relevant Federalist Papers] can justify such an interpretation,” id. at 2390 
(Stevens, J., dissenting), and “[b]ereft of support in the history of the founding,” id. at 
2391, to describe the Scalia opinion. When the Printz decision was announced, Stevens 
“took the highly unusual step of reciting lengthy excerpts from his dissent. His voice qua-
vered at times as he blasted the court for departing from tradition and crippling the ‘ma-
chinery of government.’” Edward Felsenthal, In Blockbuster Cases, Justices Rule for Re-
straint, Wall St. J. at B1 (June 30, 1997). 
 48. The Federalist No. 27, at 176 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16), quoted in Printz, 117 
S. Ct. at 2372 (Scalia, J.), 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting). To 
Justice Stevens, that unquestionably meant that the “federal government was to have the 
power to demand that local officials implement national policy programs,” Printz, 117 S. 
Ct. at 2389, thereby avoiding the difficulties of “a central government that could act only 
directly ‘upon the States in their political or collective capacities.’” Id. at 2390 (quoting 
The Federalist No. 27, at 176 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16)). 
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enforcement of its laws.”49 As Justice Souter put it, “I cannot 
persuade myself that the statements from No. 27 speak of any-
thing less than the authority of the National Government, when 
exercising an otherwise legitimate power (the commerce power, 
say), to require state ‘auxiliaries’ to take appropriate action.”50 
The incorporation-of-state-officials position is reinforced, 
Justice Souter suggested, by Madison’s discussion in Federalist 
44 of the oath requirement: 
[T]he “auxiliary” status of the state officials will occur be-
cause they are “bound by the sanctity of an oath.” . . . [In 
Federalist 44 Madison] asks why state magistrates should 
have to swear to support the National Constitution, when na-
tional officials will not be required to oblige themselves to 
support the state counterparts. His answer is that national of-
ficials “will have no agency in carrying the State Constitutions 
into effect. The members and officers of the State Govern-
ments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving 
effect to the federal Constitution.”51 
To those general principles add the learning from Federalist 
36 and 45, and the result is fairly clear. In particular, in Federal-
ist 36 Hamilton set out his understanding at some length: 
[T]here are two cases in which there can be no room for dou-
ble sets of officers: one, where the right of imposing the tax is 
exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties on 
imports; the other, where the object had not fallen under any 
State regulation or provision, which may be applicable to a 
variety of objects. In other cases, the probability is that the 
United States will either wholly abstain from the objects pre-
occupied for local purposes, or will make use of the State offi-
cers and State regulations for collecting the additional imposi-
tion. This will best answer the views of revenue, because it will 
save expense in the collection, and will best avoid any occasion 
of disgust to the State governments and to the people.52 
The national government might not be able to order state offi-
cials to engage in activities outside their usual areas of responsi-
bility, such as collecting imposts. But it makes perfect sense, ad-
 49. The Federalist No. 27, at 177 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16), quoted in Printz, 117 
S. Ct. at 2373 (Scalia, J.), 2390 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 50. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2403-04 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 2402-03 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting The Federalist No. 27, at 177 
(Hamilton) (cited in note 16), and The Federalist No. 44, at 287 (Madison) (cited in note 
16)) (footnotes omitted). 
 52. The Federalist No. 36, at 221 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16) (emphasis added). 
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ministratively and economically, for the national government to 
make use of the already existing expertise of state officials. 
The last few words quoted above from Federalist 36 suggest 
why the Printz majority’s insistence that formal agreement is 
necessary if state officials are to be used to implement national 
policies is almost certainly wrong: the founders would have 
thought formal agreement to be just that, a formality. Use of 
state officials was supposed to be beneficial to the states and 
their citizens (at least as long as Uncle Sam picked up the tab53): 
by making federal tax collectors unnecessary, it would temper 
the federal power, and make federal taxation more acceptable to 
the populace—avoiding “any occasion of disgust.”54 If you as de-
fender of states rights are worried about intrusions by the na-
tional government, would you rather have the national laws en-
forced by a swarm of new national officials or by your friends 
and neighbors—many of whom might also be dubious about na-
tional power? 
* * * * * 
Nevertheless, only four justices concluded that the historical 
record supported state officials’ administering federal tax stat-
utes without formal agreement. And, to be fair to the Printz ma-
jority, their conclusion is consistent with the tenor of New York, 
that the federal government should be legislating and administer-
ing any federal revenue system. It is the result in New York that 
distorted the analysis in Printz; we need to reexamine the his-
torical basis for the result in the older case. All of which brings 
us back to the question of the national government’s power to 
requisition funds from the states. 
 53. Whether payments to the states are constitutionally required or not, they might 
very well make sense to facilitate public policy. On the constitutional point, several jus-
tices read Federalist 36 as requiring that state officials be compensated for any federal 
enforcement activities. To that effect Justice Scalia quoted Hamilton’s discussion of the 
way to “turn the tide of State influence into the channels of the national government”: 
“employ the state officers as much as possible, and . . . attach them to the Union by an 
accumulation of their emoluments.” The Federalist No. 36, at 222 (Hamilton) (cited in 
note 16), quoted in Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2374. Relying on this language, Justice Souter in 
dissent also posited that state officials should be paid for their federal services. Printz, 
117 S. Ct. at 2404. But the Federalist 36 passage in its entirety doesn’t read as if “emolu-
ments” were constitutionally required. In fact, Hamilton didn’t seem to think the “spirit 
of influence” was serious enough to require special measures; he merely suggested a 
mechanism that could be used to deal with that spirit if it were found to be excessive. 
 54. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE NATIONAL REVENUE POWER:  WHY NEW 
YORK v. UNITED STATES SEEMS RIGHT 
New York v. United States has some plausible history at its 
core. In this section we discuss the changes in the revenue struc-
ture made by the Constitution that seem to support the result in 
New York: the apparent repudiation of requisitions and the re-
jection of proposed amendments that would have explicitly pre-
served a place for requisitions in the new national government. 
A. THE NEED FOR A NEW REVENUE STRUCTURE 
The Articles of Confederation were defective in many ways, 
but perhaps the primary defect was the national government’s 
inability to raise revenue. The national government had no 
power to tax individuals directly; the revenue was supposed to 
come from the states.55 
But the states weren’t always forthcoming with funds. Part 
of the problem was that Congress had difficulty apportioning tax 
liability among the states,56 but the real problems were the recal-
citrance of the states and the powerlessness of the national gov-
ernment to enforce the requisitions. The requisitions weren’t 
complete failures—Roger Brown has calculated a compliance 
rate of about 37 percent for the period between October 1781 
and August 178657—but that is clearly not good enough. 
Serious modification of the Articles’ revenue system was 
almost impossible; it would have required unanimous approval 
 55. Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation provided that 
[a]ll charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the com-
mon defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress 
assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied 
by the several States, in proportion to the value of all land within each State, 
granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and im-
provements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United 
States in Congress assembled, shall, from time to time, direct and appoint. 
  The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the author-
ity and direction of the Legislatures of the several States within the time agreed 
upon by the United States, in Congress assembled. 
 56. The value of land in the various states was to be used for allocation, see id., but 
few, if any, states had valued their lands, and it was only in 1783 that Congress asked for 
assessments. See Charles J. Bullock, The Origin, Purpose and Effect of the Direct-Tax 
Clause of the Federal Constitution I, 15 Pol. Sci. Q. 217, 218-19 (1900); see also The Fed-
eralist No. 21, at 143 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16) (“In every country it is a herculean 
task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a country imperfectly settled and progressive in 
improvement, the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability.”). 
 57. Roger H. Brown, Redeeming the Republic: Federalists, Taxation, and the Origins 
of the Constitution 12 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1993). 
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of the states.58 A new constitution was therefore essential if the 
national government was to satisfy its basic financial needs, par-
ticularly during times of emergency like war. Alexander Hamil-
ton was emphatic in Federalist 30: “What remedy can there be 
for this situation, but in a change of the system which has pro-
duced it—in a change in the fallacious and delusive system of 
quotas and requisitions?”59 In many respects, invigorating the 
revenue system was the most important purpose of constitution-
making. As Roger Brown has put it, “The experience with the 
breakdown of taxation . . . drove the constitutional Revolution 
of 1787.”60 
Invigorating the system was important, but it was not the 
whole story. An American generation that had fought British 
imperialism was not indifferent to the potential for abusive taxa-
tion, and few founders were willing to give the new government 
unlimited taxing power. The revenue power was a concern for 
two reasons—the effect on individuals subject to national taxes 
that could be onerous or discriminatory; and, perhaps more im-
portant, the effect on the states themselves, whose tax bases 
could be decimated by excessive national taxation.61 The requisi-
tions system under the Articles was relatively safe on both 
counts—indeed, it turned out to be too safe—because the states 
could temper the national power. If that revenue system was to 
be changed, the new system had to contain its own not-quite-so-
effective safeguards. 
As finalized, the Constitution implicitly divided taxes into 
two categories, direct and indirect, with nary a mention of requi-
sitions. We will briefly describe these types of taxes because it 
helps to understand the revenue structure of the Constitution to 
see how different it was intended to be from the requisitions sys-
tem that preceded it. 
 58. See Articles of Confederation, Art. XIII. 
 59. The Federalist No. 30, at 189 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16). 
 60. Brown, Redeeming the Republic at 3 (cited in note 57). 
 61. In the first Congress, Elbridge Gerry referred to the “annihilation of the State 
Governments” that could result from national taxation. 1 Annals of Cong. 776 (Aug. 22, 
1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Continued Gerry: “If [the states] discover a new source 
of revenue, after Congress shall have diverted all the old ones into their treasury, the ra-
pacity of the General Government can take that from them also.” Id. This was a common 
theme in debates on the Constitution. See, e.g., Essays of Brutus, N.Y. J. (Oct. 18, 1787), 
reprinted in 2 The Complete Antifederalist at 363, 366 (cited in note 42) (“When the 
foederal [sic.] government begins to exercise the right of taxation in all its parts, the legis-
latures of the several states will find it impossible to raise monies to support their gov-
ernments.”). 
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1. Indirect Taxes 
The power to levy indirect taxes—generally duties, imposts, 
and excises62—was not radically new. The states had historically 
imposed such consumption taxes, and there had been a substan-
tial push under the Articles of Confederation to grant the na-
tional government the power to levy imposts.63 Even though 
many founders assumed that the national revenue system would 
consist of indirect taxes and little else—indirect taxes would sat-
isfy all revenue needs except in times of war64—the founders 
generally did not view these taxes as oppressive. 
Indirect taxes were generally palatable to both federalists 
and antifederalists because governments have no incentive to set 
rates too high.65 If they do so, revenues will decrease as con-
sumption declines—consumers can effectively decide whether to 
pay the taxes by deciding whether to buy the taxed goods66—and 
as evasive behavior increases. With the “nature of the thing” 
thus protecting against abuse,67 constitutional draftsmen made 
indirect taxes subject to just one, relatively uncontroversial con-
stitutional limitation—the uniformity rule.68 As interpreted, that 
 62. See The Federalist No. 36, at 219 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16) (stating that by 
the term indirect taxes “must be understood duties and excises on articles of consump-
tion”). 
 63. The move was stifled by the need for unanimity to modify the Articles. See 
Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause 597-99 (Oxford U. Press, 1982). 
 64. At the Virginia ratifying convention, for example, James Madison emphasized 
that national defense requires the availability of extraordinary taxing powers, which 
would not be necessary to meet the day-to-day expenses of government: 
When, therefore, direct taxes are not necessary, they will not be recurred to. It 
can be of little advantage to those in power to raise money in a manner oppres-
sive to the people. . . . Direct taxes will only be recurred to for great pur-
poses. . . . [I]t is necessary to establish funds for extraordinary exigencies, and to 
give this power to the general government; for the utter inutility of previous 
requisitions on the states is too well known. 
3 Debates at 95-96 (June 6, 1788) (cited in note 36). 
 65. Indirect taxes are also often acceptable to taxpayers themselves because the 
taxes are hidden: purchasers of goods may not even realize that a tax is embedded in the 
purchase price. As Justice Cooley put it, “[T]his method enables the government, in the 
language of Turgot, ‘to pluck the goose without making it cry out.’ . . . [T]hose who pay 
do not perceive, or at least do not reflect, that a part of what they pay as price is really 
paid as a tax.” Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Taxation 5 n.3 (Callaghan, 
1876). 
 66. See The Federalist No. 21, at 142 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16) (“The amount to 
be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own option . . . .”). 
 67. As antifederalist Brutus explained, “[I]f [imposts] are laid higher than trade will 
bear, the merchants will cease importing, or smuggle their goods. We have therefore suf-
ficient security, arising from the nature of the thing, against burdensome and intolerable 
impositions from this kind of tax.” Essays of Brutus, N.Y. J. (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 
2 The Complete Antifederalist at 388, 392-93 (cited in note 42). 
 68. “[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
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rule simply requires geographical uniformity: the federal levies 
imposed in Georgia, for example, cannot differ from those im-
posed in New York.69 
2. Direct Taxes 
Direct taxes were thought to be much more dangerous. 
They were new; the most commonly discussed direct tax was on 
real estate, something that had not even been contemplated at 
the national level under the Articles. Unlike requisitions, direct 
taxes were to be imposed by the national government directly on 
individuals. And unlike indirect taxes, direct taxes were to hit 
the pocketbooks of affected individuals directly and painfully, 
with little or no way to avoid the taxes’ impact. The antifederal-
ist minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania described the 
fears of constitutional opponents: “The power of direct taxation 
applies to every individual, as congress, under this government, 
is expressly vested with the authority of laying a capitation or 
poll tax upon every person to any amount.”70 If unconstrained in 
their use, direct taxes could remove the states altogether from 
the national taxing process; direct taxes were seen as the antithe-
sis of requisitions. 
While almost everyone agreed that the national government 
needed a direct-tax power, if only to provide funds during emer-
gencies when indirect-tax revenues might well decline,71 most 
founders thought that a specific constitutional limitation with 
teeth was required to constrain the imposition of direct taxes. 
Even Alexander Hamilton, no friend of limits on the national 
taxing power, conceded that “[i]n a branch of taxation where no 
limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the 
nature of the thing [i.e., direct taxation], the establishment of a 
fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be attended with 
fewer inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at 
large.”72 
States.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 69. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900). 
 70. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Penn-
sylvania to Their Constituents, Pa. Packet & Daily Advertiser (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted 
in 3 The Complete Antifederalist at 145, 162 (cited in note 42). 
 71. See 5 Annals of Cong. 842 (Apr. 1, 1796) (statement of House Ways and Means 
Chairman William Smith, in discussions that ultimately led to the first direct tax, that 
“[a]lmost the whole of the present revenue depends upon commerce—on a commerce 
liable to be deranged by wars in Europe, or at the will of any of the great naval European 
Powers”). 
 72. The Federalist No. 21, at 143 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16). 
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The fixed rule accepted by the convention is found in the 
two clauses of the Constitution that require direct taxes to be 
apportioned among the states on the basis of population.73 While 
the apportionment requirement arose as part of a compromise 
about how to count slaves for purposes of representation, it did 
have a substantive purpose: it clearly is a check on the congres-
sional power to impose direct taxes. It makes the imposition of 
direct taxes difficult, and often impossible: imagine structuring a 
national real-property tax the effects of which depend on the 
populations of the states, rather than on respective values or 
acreages.74 Like the requisitions system, the apportionment rule 
constrains the national government’s power to destroy the states’ 
own revenue systems by soaking up too much money. Indeed, 
one might see the apportionment rule as a substitute for the pro-
tections inherent in a not-very-well-policed system of requisi-
tions. 
If the direct-tax apportionment rule has turned out to be a 
paper tiger, and it has, it is because the term “direct taxes” has 
been defined extremely narrowly. With one arguably aberrant 
exception (the Income Tax Cases of 1895 invalidated a late-
nineteenth century income tax, which led to the Sixteenth 
Amendment75), the term “direct taxes” has been interpreted to 
 73. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be 
laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken.”); U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 3: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Num-
bers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, 
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not 
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. 
That provision still stands, modified only by the Fourteenth Amendment’s elimination of 
the distinction between “free Persons” and “all other Persons,” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, 
§ 2, and the effective elimination of the category of “Indians not taxed” through legisla-
tion. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994)). 
The uniformity clause in the Constitution is generally inapplicable to direct taxes, if 
only because an apportioned tax necessarily must have different consequences in differ-
ent states. See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption 
Taxes Constitutional?, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2334, 2341-42 (1997). 
 74. See William Draper Lewis, The Constitutionality of the Income Tax, 34 Am. L. 
Reg. & Rev. 189, 190 (1895) (“To declare an income tax, or any other tax, a direct tax, is 
equivalent to saying that Congress cannot pass such a tax without committing great in-
equality and injustice—practically, that Congress cannot tax the subject at all, except 
possibly in time of war . . . .”). 
 75. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (determining that an 
unapportioned tax on income from real estate was unconstitutional), reh’g 158 U.S. 601 
(1895) (extending the same principle to income from personal property and concluding 
that an 1894 income-tax statute was unconstitutional in its entirety). The result in Pollock 
was effectively overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const., amend. XVI 
(“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever 
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encompass only capitation taxes and taxes on real estate.76 Al-
most all modern taxes have therefore been held to be indirect 
taxes immune from the apportionment requirement.77 
* * * * * 
Whatever the proper scope of the direct-tax clauses78—
wherever the line should be drawn between indirect and direct 
taxation—it does seem that those two categories exhausted the 
national government’s revenue powers79 and that requisitions 
therefore fell by the wayside at the Constitutional Convention. 
And there is further support for the proposition that requisitions 
were abolished by the Constitution: attempts to provide ex-
pressly for requisitions in the Constitution were unsuccessful. 
B. THE FAILED ATTEMPTS TO INCORPORATE REQUISITIONS IN 
THE CONSTITUTION 
The direct-tax apportionment rule is trivial only to the ex-
tent that the category of “direct taxes” is trivially narrow, but 
many antifederalists did not see things that way at all.  Direct 
taxes were the tough new guys on the block.  Though the direct-
tax apportionment requirement was a step in the right direction, 
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to 
any census or enumeration.”). 
 76. That construction began almost immediately after the new government began. 
See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796). 
 77. See Jensen, 97 Colum. L. Rev. at 2363-66, 2376-77 (cited in note 73).  The pri-
mary effect of the direct-tax clauses has been in labelling: Congress has had every incen-
tive to characterize levies as indirect, and therefore not subject to apportionment. Only a 
few explicitly direct taxes were ever imposed, on real estate and slaves, and none has 
been enacted since 1861.  See Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597; Act of Aug. 2, 1813, 
ch. 37, 3 Stat. 53; Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, 3 Stat. 164; Act of Feb. 27, 1815, ch. 60, 3 
Stat. 216; Act of Mar. 5, 1816, ch. 24, 3 Stat. 255; Act of Aug. 5, 1861, Ch. 45, 12 Stat. 294; 
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 599 (1881) (“[W]henever the government has im-
posed a tax which it recognized as a direct tax, it has never been applied to any objects 
but real estate and slaves.”). Other taxes that might have run afoul of the apportionment 
rule have been denominated excises or duties, and the Supreme Court has been generous 
in deferring to congressional characterizations. For example, a tax on real property is a 
direct tax, but estate taxes were held to be excises on the transfer of property and there-
fore not subject to apportionment even if only real property is transferred.  See Scholey 
v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1875); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900). 
 78. One of us has been trying to resuscitate these clauses. See generally Jensen, 97 
Colum. L. Rev. (cited in note 73) (suggesting that the scope of the clauses is far broader 
than conventional wisdom suggests). Or perhaps the right word here is “suscitate,” since 
the clauses were gutted in 1796, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hylton v. United 
States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796), and only temporarily revived by the Income Tax 
Cases. 
 79. We do not consider fees received for goods or services supplied by the national 
government—which are effectively value-for-value exchanges—to be encompassed by 
the revenue power. 
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thought many antifederalists, it did not suffice to protect the 
states’ citizens and the states’ tax bases against this new, possibly 
massive national power.  The antifederalists therefore fought to 
retain the requisitions process in an adulterated form.80 
At the Constitutional Convention, Luther Martin of Mary-
land proposed an amendment that, if accepted, would have done 
just that: requisitions would have been the normal first step in 
revenue-raising, with direct taxation available to the national 
government only as a backup. The requisitions process, that is, 
would have controlled unless a state was delinquent, at which 
point the national government could have taxed the state’s citi-
zens directly.81 At the Maryland ratifying convention, Martin ex-
plained: 
Many of the members, and myself in the number, thought that 
the States were much better judges of the circumstances of 
their citizens, and what sum of money could be collected from 
them by direct taxation, and of the manner in which it could 
be raised, with the greatest ease and convenience to their citi-
zens, than the general government could be; and that the gen-
eral government ought not to have the power of laying direct 
taxes in any case, but in that of the delinquency of a State.82 
The uniformity rule in the Constitution was not sufficient 
protection against governmental overreaching,83 argued Martin, 
because it did not prevent imposing duties, imposts, and excises 
in a way that was superficially uniform but that unfairly harmed 
states where certain types of property were concentrated.84 For 
example, a superficially uniform tax on slaves would obviously 
have burdened only the southern states. 
Martin’s proposal was not adopted, of course, but the issue 
did not go away after the Philadelphia convention. For example, 
a group that called itself “A Minority of the Maryland Ratifying 
Convention,” presumably reflecting Martin’s influence, unsuc-
cessfully asked that Maryland insist on the following constitu-
tional amendment: “That, in every law of Congress imposing di-
 80. See Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 35 (U. of Chicago 
Press, 1981) (“[W]hile the system of requisitions secures the position of the states, it un-
dermines that of the general government. Why not, then, many Anti-Federalists asked, 
make room in the system of revenue raising for both the national and the federal princi-
ples?”). 
 81. See 2 Records at 359 (Aug. 21, 1787) (cited in note 12). 
 82. Luther Martin, Mr. Martin’s Information to the General Assembly of the State of 
Maryland (1788), reprinted in 2 The Complete Antifederalist at 27, 55 (cited in note 42). 
 83. See note 68. 
 84. See Martin, Mr. Martin’s Information at 56 (cited in note 82). 
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rect taxes, the collection thereof shall be suspended for a reason-
able certain time therein limited, and on payment of the sum by 
any State, by the time appointed, such taxes shall not be col-
lected.”85 And in 1789 the brand new House of Representatives 
considered a constitutional amendment that similarly would 
have provided that direct taxes could be levied only “where the 
moneys arising from the duties, imposts, and excise, are insuffi-
cient for the public exigencies, nor then until Congress shall have 
made a requisition upon the States to assess, levy, and pay their 
respective proportions of such requisitions.”86 
But the opponents of requisitions prevailed, and the Consti-
tution was not amended. History was on the opponents’ side—
requisitions had not worked under the Articles—and there was 
serious concern about how they could ever be enforced. Alexan-
der Hamilton’s criticisms of requisitions, quoted in New York v. 
United States,87 were representative of legitimate fears: how 
could a requisition to a recalcitrant state in the late eighteenth 
century be enforced without civil war?88 
* * * * * 
We could stop here, with the national revenue power ap-
parently serving as a grand example of the rightness of New 
York v. United States. Requisitions failed, the founders created 
 85. See Address of a Minority of the Maryland Ratifying Convention, Md. Gazette 
(May 6, 1788), reprinted in 5 The Complete Antifederalist at 92, 97 (cited in note 42). The 
Virginia ratifying convention was also a hotbed of pro-requisitions sentiment. For exam-
ple, the fiery Patrick Henry exclaimed: “For I will never give up the power of direct taxa-
tion, but for a scourge: I am willing to give it conditionally; that is, after non-compliance 
with requisitions . . . .” Speeches of Patrick Henry in the Virginia State Ratifying Conven-
tion (June 5, 1788), reprinted in 5 The Complete Antifederalist at 211, 223 (cited in note 
42). And George Mason concurred: “An indispensible amendment in this case, is, that 
Congress shall not exercise the power of raising direct taxes till the States shall have re-
fused to comply with the requisitions of Congress.” Speech of George Mason in the Vir-
ginia State Ratifying Convention (June 4, 1788), reprinted in 5 The Complete Antifederal-
ist at 255, 259. 
 86. 1 Annals of Cong. 773 (Aug. 22, 1789) (Joseph Gales, ed. 1834). 
 87. See text accompanying note 37. 
 88. At the Virginia convention, Edmund Randolph stressed, “When gentlemen 
complain about the novelty [of direct taxes], they ought to advert to the singular one that 
must be the consequence of the requisitions—an army sent into your country to force 
you to comply.” 3 Debates at 122 (June 7, 1788) (cited in note 36). Madison too warned 
about the consequences of a requisitions process with a strong national government that 
would have to enforce its levies against the states: 
When [exercise of congressional power] comes in the form of a punishment, 
great clamors will be raised among the people against the government; hatred 
will be excited against it. . . . I conceive that every requisition that will be made 
on my part of America will kindle a contention between the delinquent member 
and the general government. 
Id. at 251-52 (June 11, 1788). 
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an entirely new taxing system that kept its hands off the states, 
and that is the end of it. Or is it? 
III. WERE REQUISITIONS ABOLISHED? 
It is clear that many of the founders did not view requisi-
tions, which had worked so poorly under the Articles, as a gen-
erally useful way to raise revenue, and hardly anyone defended 
them as the only significant source of national funds. They un-
questionably were not intended to play a central role in the con-
stitutional republic. But that is not the same as saying that requi-
sitions are impermissible. Not all principles are constitutional 
principles, and that is why New York v. United States may have 
been wrong in its history. 
In all of the discussion in Printz about who could serve as 
collectors of federal taxes—whether the officials would be fed-
eral or state employees—the justices ignored a more fundamen-
tal point: if the national government can order a state to devise a 
system to collect billions of dollars, the tax collection questions 
discussed in Printz are so trivial that they are beside the point. 
And if New York v. United States was wrong in concluding that 
the national government could not compel states to participate 
in federal regulatory schemes, the Printz result, which depended 
on New York’s rightness, must be wrong as well. 
In fact, many in the founding generation thought that requi-
sitions survived ratification of the Constitution. For many anti-
federalists, survival of requisitions remained a fervent hope. The 
hope may seem to have defied logic, given the failure to obtain 
the sought-after constitutional language. But all that had been 
rejected in the fights about amending the Constitution was the 
use of requisitions as a mandatory prerequisite to invoking the 
direct-tax power.89 There was no specific rejection of requisitions 
under all circumstances.90 
 89. See notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
 90. Some antifederalists hoped that the direct-tax apportionment rule itself might 
be interpreted as requisitions-in-disguise. For example, one of the Letters from the Fed-
eral Farmer discussed the relationship between the apportionment and the general taxing 
clauses: 
By the first recited clause, direct taxes shall be apportioned on the states. This 
seems to favour the idea suggested by some sensible men and writers, that con-
gress, as to direct taxes, will only have power to make requisitions, but the latter 
clause, power to lay and collect taxes, etc seems clearly to favour the contrary 
opinion and, in my mind, the true one, that congress shall have power to tax 
immediately individuals, without the intervention of the state legislatures . . . . 
Letters from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 The Complete Antifederal-
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It was not just the antifederalists who saw, or hoped for, 
continued life for requisitions. Although requisitions would no 
longer be (and should no longer be) the primary means of rais-
ing revenue, many supporters of the Constitution assumed that 
Congress retained the power to issue requisitions. And why not? 
The Constitution was intended to increase the national power at 
the expense of the states. Permitting the federal government to 
tax individuals directly, circumventing the states, added to the 
national power. Why assume that, at the same time national 
power over individuals was being increased under the Constitu-
tion, the founders meant to take away the powers that had ex-
isted, at least in theory, under the Articles of Confederation? 
In Federalist 36, other parts of which were discussed in 
Printz, Alexander Hamilton, the most nationalistic of all nation-
alists, left no doubt that he thought Congress could issue requisi-
tions under the Constitution—exactly the opposite of the posi-
tion for which he was quoted in New York v. United States.91 The 
critical passage is so important that it deserves to be quoted in 
full: 
It has been very properly observed by different speakers and 
writers on the side of the Constitution that if the exercise of 
the power of internal taxation by the Union should be discov-
ered on experiment to be really inconvenient, the federal 
government may then forbear the use of it, and have recourse 
to requisitions in its stead. By way of answer to this, it has 
been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first instance omit 
that ambiguous power and rely upon the latter resource? Two 
solid answers may be given. The first is that the actual exer-
cise of that power if convenient, will be preferable because it 
will be more effectual; and it is impossible to prove in theory, 
or otherwise than by experiment, that it cannot be advanta-
geously exercised. The contrary, indeed, appears most prob-
able. The second answer is that the existence of such a power in 
ist at 245 (cited in note 42). But the Federal Farmer was realistic: 
[I]n fact the first clause appears to me only to provide that each state shall pay a 
certain portion of the tax, and the latter to provide that congress shall have 
power to lay and collect taxes, that is to assess upon, and to collect of the indi-
viduals in the state, the state[']s quota . . . . 
Id. at 245-46. 
 91. See text accompanying note 37.  We recognize that public figures’ positions of-
ten change over time and that Hamilton, as promoter of the Constitution in The Federal-
ist, sometimes emphasized limitations on national power that he later discounted when 
he was engaged in creating a strong national government. But precisely because he was a 
proponent of nationalism, we see no reason to think that he would have recanted his 
Federalist view that, as a constitutional matter, the states could be ordered to respond to 
requisitions. 
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the Constitution will have a strong influence in giving efficacy 
to requisitions. When the States know that the Union can apply 
itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for exer-
tion on their part.92 
Should indirect and direct taxes be used only if and when 
requisitions failed, as antifederalists had argued? No, answered 
Hamilton, the country needed to give a try to new, more effi-
cient forms of revenue-raising. But requisitions remained as a 
backup. 
Federalist 36 by itself might not prove everything, of course, 
but the language there is much clearer and more definite than 
anything Justice Scalia could point to in Printz on the consensual 
arrangement point. And there is also some support in The Fed-
eralist for the idea that the direct-tax apportionment rule, al-
though it did not mandate requisitions, was consistent with the 
continued use of a requisitions process. The census would de-
termine each state’s share of the total to be raised through direct 
taxation, and the federal government could give the order to 
each state for so many dollars. Each state could then decide how 
to satisfy that obligation—perhaps even deciding what and when 
to tax.93 
Some of that evidence is in the passages discounted by the 
Printz majority, such as Hamilton’s reference to the national leg-
islature’s making “use of the system of each State within that 
State.”94 Perhaps the most extensive description is found in 
Madison’s Federalist 44 (also discussed in Printz). If a direct tax 
is imposed—unlikely but possible—the tax collectors will ordi-
narily be state officials because they will be collecting an amount 
 92. The Federalist No. 36, at 220-21 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16) (emphasis added). 
The italicized language recognizes that the states might balk at complying with federal 
requisitions, but that language does not imply that the states would have a legal—as op-
posed to a political—choice about whether to fulfill a requisition. 
 93. Or, even more intrusively, Congress might decide what is to be taxed in each 
state. At the Virginia ratifying convention, for example, Edmund Randolph said: 
Congress is only to say on what subject the tax is to be laid. It is a matter of very 
little consequence how it will be imposed, since it must be clearly laid on the 
most productive article in each particular state. . . . Were the tax laid on one 
uniform article through the Union, its operation would be oppressive on a con-
siderable part of the people. When any sum is necessary for the general gov-
ernment, every state will immediately know its exact proportion of it, from the 
number of their people and representatives; nor can it be doubted that the tax 
will be laid on each state, in the manner that will best accommodate the people 
of such state, as thereby it will be raised with more facility; for an oppressive 
mode can never be so productive as the most easy for the people. 
3 Debates at 121-22 (June 7, 1788) (cited in note 12). 
 94. The Federalist No. 36, at 220 (Hamilton) (cited in note 16). 
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equal to the state’s direct-tax quota, just as was true under the 
requisitions system: 
[I]t is probable that this power [of collecting internal as well 
as external taxes] will not be resorted to, except for supple-
mental purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given 
to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of 
their own; and that the eventual collection, under the imme-
diate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the of-
ficers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several 
States.95 
To be sure, Madison was not writing about a full-fledged 
requisitions system: the states as states would participate only if 
they elected to, and Madison assumed that the dollars involved 
would not exceed the states’ already existing revenue capaci-
ties.96 Nevertheless, the role Madison envisioned for the states in 
this federal revenue scheme, acting under the immediate author-
ity of the Union, was much greater than the Court suggested was 
possible in either New York or Printz. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence that requisitions survived 
under the Constitution, at least in the minds of many in the 
founding generation, is found in the debates leading to the en-
actment of the first direct-tax statute, ultimately passed in 1798. 
In a 1796 report on direct taxation, prepared at congressional 
request, Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott suggested three pos-
sible approaches: Congress could specify the objects of taxation; 
Congress could elect to tax whatever items the states were al-
ready taxing directly; or Congress could require the states to de-
termine what to tax, make the actual collections, and turn over 
the appropriate amounts to the federal government.97 
 95. The Federalist No. 44, at 292 (Madison) (cited in note 16). At the Virginia rati-
fying convention, in response to the suggestion that Congress (“ten men deputed from 
this state, and others in proportion from other states,” 3 Debates at 253 (June 11, 1788) 
(cited in note 36)) would “not be able to adjust direct taxes, so as to accommodate the 
various citizens in thirteen states,” id., Madison answered, “Could not ten intelligent 
men, chosen from ten districts from this state, lay direct taxes on a few objects in the 
most judicious manner?” Id. at 253-54. And Congress could defer to those groups of in-
telligent men across the country: “If it should have a general power of taxation, they 
could select the most proper objects, and distribute the taxes in such a manner as that 
they should fall in a due degree on every member of the community. They will be limited 
to fix the proportion of each state, and they must raise it in the most convenient and sat-
isfactory manner to the public.” Id. at 255. (We admit to confusion about the antecedents 
of some pronouns in Madison’s statement.) 
 96. Even in that case, however, the dollars taken by the federal government would 
restrict a state’s capacity to undertake other projects. 
 97. 6 Annals of Cong. 2636, 2699 (Dec. 14, 1796) (reprinting Wolcott’s report) 
[“Wolcott Report”]; see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist 
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Different participants in the policy-making process had dif-
ferent views about the merits of each of Wolcott’s possibilities, 
but none apparently saw constitutional constraints on any of the 
choices. Wolcott, for example, rejected reliance on state systems 
because of practical, not constitutional, considerations—it 
smacked too much of the ineffective system of requisitions98—
but Representative Joseph B. Varnum of Massachusetts de-
fended the practicality of such a method, obviously assuming the 
method’s constitutionality.99 While the House Ways and Means 
Committee finally recommended directly taxing land, improve-
ments, and slaves under a national system—the form of direct 
taxation eventually adopted100—the Committee had originally 
proposed that the federal statute should incorporate state law,101 
and the full House initially accepted that proposal.102 
After reviewing the legislative history of the 1798 direct-tax 
statute, David Currie concluded that no one saw “any constitu-
tional impediment to laying taxes that differed from one state to 
another, or to delegating to the states authority to define and 
collect federal taxes.”103 “Delegating” has a wishy-washy sound 
to it. We can restate the point in a way that ties the analysis to 
New York v. United States: no one saw a constitutional impedi-
ment to the national government’s ordering the states to collect 
Period, 1789-1801, at 225 (U. of Chicago Press, 1997). 
 98. Wolcott Report at 2699 (cited in note 97) (“[I]t partakes of the system of requi-
sitions . . . which utterly failed under the late Confederation, and to remedy which, was 
one great object of establishing the present Government.”). 
It can be dangerous to rely too much on federalists’ rationalizations for increasing 
national power in the first decade of the nation’s existence. Hamilton, for one clear ex-
ample, took much more expansive interpretations of constitutional power after the crea-
tion of the government than he had when writing as Publius. See Jensen, 97 Colum. L. 
Rev. at 2357-60 (cited in note 73).  But in the first direct-tax debate it was not just the 
federalists who assumed that requisitions, or something like requisitions, remained possi-
ble under the Constitution. 
 99. See 6 Annals of Cong. 1882 (Jan. 16, 1797): 
The several States being convinced that the authority of the General Govern-
ment would be exercised if the money was not furnished by the time prefixed, 
they would in all probability make the remittance; but if any State should fail of 
doing it, this Government would make the assessment on the inhabitants of the 
delinquent States . . . . 
 100. 2 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, at 265 (May 5, 
1798) (D. Appleton and Co., 1857); see Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597. 
 101. 5 Annals of Cong. 793 (Mar. 17, 1796) (recommending that the Secretary of the 
Treasury be directed to develop a direct-tax plan, “adapting the [plan] to such objects of 
direct taxation and such modes of collection as may appear, by the laws and practice of 
the States respectively, to be most eligible in each”). 
 102. Id. at 856 (Apr. 4, 1796) (adopting Committee recommendations with only mi-
nor modifications). 
 103. Currie, The Constitution in Congress at 225-26 (cited in note 97) (footnote omit-
ted). 
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specified numbers of dollars. That is, no one saw a constitutional 
prohibition against ordering the states to play a central role in 
the national revenue system. 
In 1813 it was still assumed that the states had a role to play. 
A short-lived wartime direct-tax statute enacted that year dele-
gated significant responsibility to the states. The statute went so 
far as to apportion the tax liability throughout the United States 
on a county-by-county basis, but “each state may vary, by an act 
of its legislature, the respective quotas imposed by this act on its 
several counties or districts, so as more equally and equitably to 
apportion the tax.”104 Moreover, the statute provided that the 
states were to pay their quotas to the Treasury, with a discount of 
up to fifteen percent if a state made payment on a timely basis.105 
In short, there is substantial evidence that the Constitution 
left intact the federal government’s power to impose requisitions 
on the states. This evidence reflects the views of both supporters 
and opponents of ratification, and this understanding persisted 
beyond the time of the framing. Whether or not a system of req-
uisitions is a good idea—and most founders thought not—it is 
not necessarily unconstitutional.106 
* * * * * 
 104. Act of Aug. 2, 1813, § 6, ch. 37, 3 Stat. 53, 71. 
 105. Id. § 7. The idea that the Constitution permits requisitions is not just ancient 
history; it survived well beyond the founding era. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion 
in the second Income Tax Case in 1895, which held that an unapportioned income tax 
was unconstitutional, confirms that the states could play a role under a direct-tax regime. 
Chief Justice Melville Fuller wrote that, if a state wanted to serve as a buffer between the 
national government and its citizens, as Madison had suggested in Federalist 44, it could 
do so: 
[The states] did not grant the power of direct taxation without regard to their 
own condition and resources as states; but they granted the power of appor-
tioned direct taxation, a power just as efficacious to serve the needs of the gen-
eral government, but securing to the States the opportunity to pay the amount 
apportioned, and to recoup from their own citizens in the most feasible way, 
and in harmony with their systems of self-government. 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 620-21 (1895); see also id. at 632-33. 
The states, that is, could decide whether to position themselves as intermediaries be-
tween the states’ residents and the national direct-tax power that would otherwise extend 
directly to those residents. 
Like James Madison in Federalist 44, see note 95 and accompanying text, Chief Jus-
tice Fuller described an arrangement that arguably falls short of ordering the states to 
create a specific regulatory scheme to further national mandates. But the Fuller opinion 
reminds us that the idea of requisitions, or something like requisitions, hadn’t died a cen-
tury after the ratification of the Constitution. 
 106. Further support for the constitutionality of requisitions can be found in Calvin 
H. Johnson, The Foul-Up in the Core of the Constitution: Apportionment of Direct Taxes 
(forthcoming). 
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We have demonstrated, we hope, that requisitions are con-
stitutional, but we recognize that more must be said to connect 
that conclusion to the analysis in New York and Printz. The req-
uisitions system did not make major demands on the states; in-
deed, it was because requisitions were so sensitive to state pre-
rogatives that they did not work very well. Perhaps the 
constitutionality of requisitions therefore tells us little about the 
extent of national power under the Tenth Amendment. Justice 
Stevens may have been suggesting as much in his Printz dissent: 
That method of governing [under the Articles] proved to be unacceptable, not 
because it demeaned the sovereign character of the several States, but rather 
because it was cumbersome and inefficient. Indeed, a confederation that allows 
each of its members to determine the ways and means of complying with an 
overriding requisition is obviously more deferential to state sovereignty con-
cerns than a national government that uses its own agents to impose its will di-
rectly on the citizenry.
107
 
If Justice Stevens meant to discount the significance of req-
uisitions for Tenth Amendment purposes—and we are not sure 
he meant to—he was wrong: he ignored the potential for requisi-
tions to overwhelm state administrative systems and to affect 
state priorities. 
Imagine a state receiving a requisition for several billion 
dollars. To satisfy the requisition, the state might well have to 
raise taxes (either by enacting a new taxing statute or by raising 
tax rates), and it might also have to increase the size of its en-
forcement staff. Alternatively, the state might choose to leave its 
tax system unchanged and simply spend less money on its own 
programs. But New York would treat the requisition as unconsti-
tutional because it was a federal order for the states—and only 
the states—to act. Although the requisition might give the state 
some latitude in how to comply, it precludes the state from de-
ciding not to comply. 
Moreover, the requisition compels the state’s tax collectors 
to devote their time and energy to obtaining revenue on behalf 
of the federal government rather than on behalf of the state. 
This would, as the New York Court emphasized, undermine the 
accountability of both state and federal officials. The state gov-
ernment would be mistakenly blamed for its high taxes by con-
fused voters who did not realize that some of their tax payments 
were being sent on to Washington to satisfy the requisition, and 
the federal government would be insulated from criticism be-
 107. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2389 (Stevens, dissenting). Since he was not facing the ques-
tion directly, it is hard to be sure whether Stevens was assuming the constitutionality of 
requisitions. But this passage is consistent with an assumption of constitutionality. 
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cause taxpayers would not realize how much revenue Washing-
ton was actually receiving.108 
Could one seriously argue that imposing routine obligations 
on local sheriffs, the burden at issue in Printz, is constitutionally 
impermissible while ordering a state to come up with so many 
billions of dollars is not? What would be the constitutional sense 
of such a distinction? 
CONCLUSION 
We do not intend this essay to be a defense of original un-
derstanding in constitutional interpretation; indeed, the authors 
have somewhat different views on the merits of that subject. Our 
position is much narrower: if courts use an original-
understanding interpretive theory, they need to get that under-
standing as close to right as possible. But in New York v. United 
States, the Court, on originalist premises, elevated the founders’ 
quite defensible rule of prudence—that the federal government 
ought not to be compelling state governments to discharge fed-
eral obligations—to a general constitutional principle. And in 
Printz v. United States, the Court compounded the error by ex-
tending that principle from state legislatures to state executives. 
We think the evidence about the requisition power calls into 
question the originalist premises underlying the Court’s current 
approach to the Tenth Amendment. 
Although New York and Printz are unpersuasive on origi-
nalist grounds, their anti-commandeering principle might be jus-
tified on the basis of an alternative approach to constitutional in-
terpretation.109 But the Court has not yet offered such an 
explanation. The available evidence suggests that the Constitu-
tion did not necessarily forbid federal compulsion of state gov-
ernments. It is not likely to happen, but the national government 
has the power today to compel the states to participate in a na-
tional revenue system. 
 
 108. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69. 
 109. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 
Va. L. Rev. 633, 681-88 (1993). 
